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Abstract
Online antisocial behavior, such as cyberbullying, ha-
rassment, and trolling, is a widespread problem that
threatens free discussion and has negative physical and
mental health consequences for victims and communi-
ties. While prior work has proposed automated methods
to identify hostile comments in online discussions, these
methods work retrospectively on comments that have
already been posted, making it difficult to intervene be-
fore an interaction escalates. In this paper we instead
consider the problem of forecasting future hostilities in
online discussions, which we decompose into two tasks:
(1) given an initial sequence of non-hostile comments in
a discussion, predict whether some future comment will
contain hostility; and (2) given the first hostile comment
in a discussion, predict whether this will lead to an es-
calation of hostility in subsequent comments. Thus, we
aim to forecast both the presence and intensity of hostile
comments based on linguistic and social features from
earlier comments. To evaluate our approach, we intro-
duce a corpus of over 30K annotated Instagram com-
ments from over 1,100 posts. Our approach is able to
predict the appearance of a hostile comment on an In-
stagram post ten or more hours in the future with an
AUC of .82 (task 1), and can furthermore distinguish
between high and low levels of future hostility with an
AUC of .91 (task 2).
1 Introduction
Harassment, and the aggressive and antisocial content it en-
tails, is a persistent problem for social media — 40% of
users have experienced it (Duggan et al. 2014). Existing ap-
proaches for addressing toxic content, including automated
mechanisms, crowdsourced moderation, and user controls,
have so far been ineffective at reducing hostility. Addressing
harassment and other hostile online behaviors is challenging
in part because people (Guberman and Hemphill 2017), poli-
cies (Pater et al. 2016), and laws (Nocentini et al. 2010) dis-
agree about what constitutes unacceptable behavior, it takes
so many forms, occurs in so many contexts, and is started
by many different kinds of users (Phillips and Milner 2017;
Phillips 2015; Cheng et al. 2017).
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Instead of trying to model all unacceptable content, we
focus on a single class of content — hostile comments —
that are common to a number of types of unwanted behav-
ior including harassment and aggression. We define a hostile
comment as one containing harassing, threatening, or offen-
sive language directed toward a specific individual or group.
Automated detection using bots or machine learning
to identify and possibly deter online harassment shows
promise (Sood, Churchill, and Antin 2012; Geiger 2016;
Reynolds, Kontostathis, and Edwards 2011), and would
greatly reduce the burden on human moderators (both lay
users and moderators employed by social media platforms).
However, a key pitfall of existing automated methods is that
they work retrospectively on comments that have already
been posted, making it difficult to intervene before an inter-
action escalates. In other words, users and moderators must
first be exposed to the content before it can be removed. Cur-
rently, no existing tools incorporate the affordances of pre-
dictive models to prevent harassment rather than react to it.
In this paper, we propose a method to forecast the arrival
of hostile comments on Instagram posts. In order to sup-
port different intervention strategies, as well as to assess the
difficulty of variants of this problem, we consider two fore-
casting tasks: (1) hostility presence forecasting: given the
initial sequence of non-hostile comments in a post, predict
whether some future comment will be hostile; (2) hostility
intensity forecasting: given the first hostile comment in a
post, predict whether the post will receive more than N hos-
tile comments in the future. Solutions to the first task would
support more aggressive interventions that attempt to elim-
inate all hostile comments from the system, while solutions
to the second task would focus interventions on the most ex-
treme cases.
We evaluate our approach on a newly constructed dataset
of over 30k Instagram comments on over 1,100 posts. We
identify a number of features computed over the current con-
versation as well as previous conversations that together pro-
vide a strong signal to forecast future hostilities in online
communications. Our approach is able to predict the appear-
ance of a hostile comment on a post ten or more hours in the
future with an AUC of 0.82 (task 1), and can furthermore
distinguish between high and low levels of hostility inten-
sity with an AUC of 0.91 (task 2).
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2 Related Work
In this section, we review prior methods for detecting hostile
content online, as well as sociological literature motivating
some of the predictive features used in this study.
2.1 Detecting hostile and antisocial content
The three primary approaches to detecting hostile content
are (1) crowd-sourced reporting, (2) moderators, (3) auto-
mated detection algorithms. Most websites, blogs, and so-
cial media platforms crowdsource reporting and rely on their
users to report or flag content as being abusive or in violation
of the platform’s terms and conditions. Many systems also
include blocking controls that allow users to prevent others
from viewing or commenting on their content. Human com-
mercial content moderators may then attend to the flagged
posts (Crawford and Gillespie 2014). Crowdsourced bot-
based Twitter blocklists (Geiger 2016) combine automa-
tion, crowdsourcing, and user controls to help users mod-
erate their feeds.
The flagging or reporting approach to responding to ha-
rassment exposes not only users to potentially abusive con-
tent but also the moderators who respond to it (Roberts
2016). Also, like any collaborative filtering mechanism,
crowdsourcing harassment detection runs the risk of shilling
attacks (Su and Khoshgoftaar 2009) where people give pos-
itive recommendations to their own materials and negative
recommendations to others’. These reporting mechanisms
also rely on free labor from members of marginalized com-
munities, and often result in the reporters being targeted for
additional harassment (Nakamura 2015).
Automated algorithms may also be used to augment or re-
place crowdsourced moderation. In theory, automated clas-
sification of posted content would permit social media plat-
forms to respond to greater quantities of reports in less time,
thus minimizing users’ exposure. To this end, effective clas-
sifiers would allow platforms to keep abreast of toxic con-
tent. Automated mechanisms are the least common approach
to addressing hostile content currently, but Instagram re-
cently introduced tools to fight spam and encourage kinder
commenting (Thompson 2017).
Prior work in this area has focused on the classification
of existing, rather than future, content (Yin et al. 2009).
A number of classification systems have been proposed to
identify toxic content, using standard text features such as
TF-IDF, lexicons, and sentiment, as well as social-network
features, such as number of friends/followers, and demo-
graphic attributes (Yin et al. 2009; Dinakar, Reichart,
and Lieberman 2011; Reynolds, Kontostathis, and Edwards
2011; Sood, Churchill, and Antin 2012; Dadvar et al. 2012;
Bellmore et al. 2015; Geiger 2016; Al-garadi, Varathan, and
Ravana 2016).
In this paper, we consider the more ambitious problem of
forecasting future hostile content, which has the potential to
allow stakeholders to stay ahead of some toxic content. Do-
ing so would allow alternative intervention strategies, such
as issuing alerts to indicate an immediate threat and to trig-
ger both social and technical responses to potential hostili-
ties. Task 1’s results are especially useful here where we are
able to forecast whether non-hostile comments will be fol-
lowed by hostile comments. Task 2’s results can additionally
help prioritize interventions to posts that are likely to see a
sharp rise in hostile comments.
Few attempts at forecasting have been made so far, but
some researchers have developed features that may be useful
for this task. For instance, Wang and Cardie (2016) classify
disputes using lexical, topic, discussion, and sentiment fea-
tures. One of their features, sentiment transition, estimates
the probability of sentiment changing from one sentence to
the next. The feature is used to augment the classifier’s over-
all labeling capabilities. That is, rather than attempting to
use sentiment transition probability to predict whether there
will be a dispute within the next N comments, the feature
is used to bolster the classification of the sentiment within
existing content.
Recently, Cheng et al. (2017) examined whether features
of the context of a conversation and/or users involved could
predict whether a future post will be flagged for removal by
a moderator in a news discussion board. They found that an
individual’s mood and contextual features of a given discus-
sion (e.g., how recently others had posted flag-worthy com-
ments, how much time had passed since their own last com-
ment) are related to an individual’s likelihood of writing a
flagged comment. Relating to discussion context, they found
that an initial flagged comment predicts future flagged com-
ments, and that the likelihood of a new discussant posting a
trolling comment increases with the number of flag-worthy
comments already present within a thread. While similarly
motivated, there are several important distinctions between
this past work and the present study: first, we forecast hos-
tility, rather than flagged posts; second, the best model in
Cheng et al. (2017) assumes knowledge of the username
of the author of the future flagged post, which, while use-
ful for understanding the nature of trolling, is not a feature
that would be observable by a real forecasting system. (It re-
quires knowing who will comment on a post in the future.)
2.2 Sociological indicators of conflict
The literature on conflict and escalation reveal that certain
patterns of interaction are more likely to lead to hostile com-
munication, and we therefore include features that capture
patterns in the comment thread. For instance, a “conflict
spiral” (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim 1994) occurs when parties
mirror each other’s aggressive communication tactics mean-
ing that no matter who posts the first aggressive comment,
other users will likely follow with aggressive comments of
their own. Research on empathy in online communities sug-
gests that people rarely ask for help directly (Preece 1998;
Pfeil and Zaphiris 2007), but it is likely that help begets help
in the same way that aggression begets aggression. In our In-
stagram scenario, this means that conversations where hos-
tile comments are followed by positive comments may be
able to recover rather than devolve into more hostility.
Conflict spirals are less likely to occur when social bonds
between parties can mediate the escalation (Rubin, Pruitt,
and Kim 1994). Social similarity also mediates conflict — in
part because it is easier for us to empathize with people who
are similar (Krebs 1975). Relatively homogeneous groups
posts comments hostilecomments
hostile posts 591 21,608 4,083
non-hostile posts 543 9,379 0
total 1,134 30,987 4,083
Table 1: Statistics of the Instagram posts. Hostile posts are
those with at least one hostile comment.
in which people see themselves as “in-group members” are
less likely to experience hostility as well (Dovidio et al.
2013). Together, social similarity and in-group preferences
mean that posts with homogeneous commenters should be
less likely to receive many hostile comments. Our conversa-
tion trend and user similarity features (c.f., §5) enable us to
examine the predictive utility patterns of hostility and social
similarity.
Prior behavior is a useful indicator of future behavior. For
instance, as mentioned above, Cheng and colleagues found
that a user’s previous posting history was a reasonable pre-
dictor of their future posts but that the context in which they
post were better predictors (Cheng et al. 2017). Similarly,
Chen et al. (2012), classify both users and content, recogniz-
ing that features of both are potentially useful for reducing
antisocial behaviors. We include measures of both authors’
and commenters’ previous posts and use different measures
of time and comment thread patterns.
Many toxic remarks contain various types of profan-
ity (Ma¨rtens et al. 2015; Wang et al. 2014) or hate
speech (Davidson et al. 2017); we use existing lexicons to
generate features for both. However, we recognize that what
constitutes hate speech and profanity depends on the con-
text and geography of use (Sood, Antin, and Churchill 2012;
Davidson et al. 2017).
In summary, the vast majority of prior work has focused
on identifying hostile messages after they have been posted;
here, we focus on forecasting the presence and intensity of
future hostile comments. The primary contributions of this
paper, then, are as follows:
• The creation of a new corpus of over 30K Instagram com-
ments annotated by the presence of hostility (§3).
• A temporal clustering analysis to identify distinct patterns
of hostile conversations (§4).
• The formulation of two new tasks and machine learning
solutions to forecast the presence and intensity of hostile
comments on Instagram posts (§5).
• A thorough empirical analysis to understand the strengths
and weaknesses of the forecasting algorithms (§6-7).
3 Data collection and annotation
Given the prevalence of online harassment among
teenagers (Duggan et al. 2014; Duggan 2017), as well
as the vulnerability of this population, we decided to
target our data collection to this group. According to local
Figure 1: Rank-count plots of statistics of posts.
schools, parent groups, and recent surveys (NORC 2017),
Instagram is one of the most popular social media sites
among teenagers. Instagram’s predominantly public content
and associated comments make it possible to collect and
annotate the content necessary for our experiments.1
We refer to a user-provided image and its associated com-
ments as a post. Each post is authored by one user, and each
post may have hundreds of comments from other users. Each
comment carries a username and timestamp. To collect a
sample of posts from this population, we first seeded a web
crawler with the usernames of users who have public ac-
counts, and who, upon manual inspection, appear to match
the target age demographic, live in the United States, and
post predominately in English. We then collected their most
recent posts and associated comments. We then conducted
snowball sampling by adding usernames discovered in each
comment to a queue of additional users to crawl. This re-
sulted in over 15M comments.
For annotation purposes, we defined a hostile comment as
one containing harassing, threatening, or offensive language
directed toward a specific individual or group. We focus on
this type of content as it is a common characteristic in many
different types of antisocial, unwanted internet behavior and
1All data and research protocols in this paper were approved by
the relevant Institutional Review Board.
is a high priority for intervention. For training and valida-
tion, we required a sample of posts for which all comments
are labeled with a binary indicator of hostility.
As with many other classification problems with high
class imbalance, uniform sampling would result in a very
low fraction of positive instances. To more efficiently allo-
cate annotation resources, we first built a search interface to
interactively explore the 15M comments retrieved via snow-
ball sampling. After several rounds of searching and brows-
ing, we identified a broad selection of keywords that fre-
quently occur in hostile comments (e.g., certain profanities,
abbreviations, and emojis). We then uniformly sampled 538
comments matching at least one of the identified keywords,
and then downloaded all the comments from the parent post
of each comment for annotation, resulting in over 20K com-
ments. Additionally, because the experiments also require
posts without any hostile comments, we sampled for annota-
tion an additional 596 posts that did not contain any hostility
keywords. (Due to the nature of our crawling procedure, we
draw these non-hostile posts from similar user populations
as the hostile posts.) Altogether, this resulted in 1,134 posts
with 30,987 comments for annotation.
These 30,987 comments were annotated by Amazon Me-
chanical Turk workers who had passed certification tests in-
dicating agreement with our labeling of example content.
Each comment was annotated by two independent workers,
with disagreements resolved by a third worker when needed.
For the annotation tasks, workers were presented with an
Instagram post (consisting of an image and, in some cases,
a caption) and comments written in response to the post. We
instructed workers to determine whether a comment was in-
nocuous, hostile or offensive, or contained a physical threat.
We also asked workers to mark comments that appear to be
flashpoints—points within already-hostile conversations at
which hostility escalates precipitously, or at which a non-
hostile conversation becomes markedly hostile. We directed
workers to make judgments based on users’ presumed intent
to cause harm or distress to other users. Overall, workers
were in agreement 87% of the time when assessing whether
a comment was hostile (Cohen’s κ = .5).
Roughly half (591) of the posts contain at least one hos-
tile comment, and the remainder (543) have no hostile com-
ments. Across all data, 4,083 of 30,987 comments (13%) are
hostile. (See Table 1.)
Figure 1 shows additional data statistics as rank-count
plots (which rank posts in descending order of each statis-
tic).
All five statistics — comments per post, hostile comments
per post, time-duration of conversations on a post, time until
the first hostile comment, and unique users per post — ex-
hibit long-tail properties. We also note that discussions on a
post extend over long time periods — the median post re-
ceives its final comment 10 days after the post was created.
Similarly, while the first hostile comment often appears the
day the post is created, 20% of hostile posts do not receive
a hostile comment until 5 or more days after they were cre-
ated.
In summary, these data suggest that the commenting fea-
ture on Instagram is heavily used, with posts receiving many
Figure 2: Volume of hostile comments over time for four
discovered clusters of posts.
comments from many users over long periods of time. Fur-
thermore, among posts containing at least one hostile com-
ment, the volume and temporal frequency of hostile com-
ments appear to vary substantially between posts, which mo-
tivates our tasks of forecasting both the presence and inten-
sity of hostile comments.
4 Identifying hostility patterns suitable for
forecasting
To motivate the forecasting tasks, we first explored varia-
tions in the onset and volume of hostile comments to deter-
mine which sorts of posts may be amenable to forecasting.
To do so, we performed a cluster analysis to identify groups
of posts that exhibit similar temporal characteristics. We first
constructed a time series for each post by counting the num-
ber of hostile comments posted within each hour from the
time the post was created.2 We restricted this analysis to the
501 posts that have at least one hostile comment within the
first 10 days. We then clustered the time series using the K-
2 We smooth each series with a Gaussian kernel (width=5,
σ=1).
Spectral Centroid (K-SC) clustering algorithm of Yang and
Leskovec (2011). K-SC clusters a set of time series using
a distance measure that is invariant to scaling and shifting,
enabling us to identify posts that have similarly shaped time
series of hostile post frequency.
Figure 2 shows four discovered clusters of posts.3
Each gray line corresponds to the smoothed time series
for a single post, and the blue lines indicate the centroid of
each cluster. The y-axis is scaled to 1 by dividing each se-
ries by its maximum value. We can see four distinct patterns.
Cluster 0 has the lowest level of hostility (only three hostile
comments, on average), and these hostile comments arrive
almost immediately after the post is created. Cluster 1 also
has a relatively small number of hostile comments, but these
can arrive much later (19 hours after the post was created,
on average). Clusters 2 and 3 show a similar pattern, but for
posts with roughly three times the volume of hostile posts.
Thus, clusters 1 and 3 both have a delay in the onset of the
first hostile message, but cluster 3 results in a much higher
volume of hostile messages in the remainder of the com-
ments.
These results provide some insight into what sorts of in-
terventions may have an impact and what their limitations
may be. For example, posts from cluster 0 appear to be a low
priority for intervention — the hostile comments are isolated
incidents that occur too quickly for any preventative action.
In contrast, in clusters 1 and 3 the time lag before hostile
comments appear presents an opportunity to intervene be-
fore hostilities escalate — e.g., by blocking comments, tak-
ing down a post, or other means. This motivates our first
task of forecasting a future hostile comment in a post. Ad-
ditionally, while the first hostile comment appears similarly
quickly in clusters 0 and 2, if we could distinguish between
the two after the first hostile comment appears, we could pri-
oritize posts from cluster 2 for intervention. This motivates
our second task of forecasting the total volume of hostile
comments a post will eventually receive.
5 Forecasting hostility
In this section, we formalize our two forecasting tasks
and our proposed approach. Our data consist of m posts
{p1 . . . pm}, where post pi is an ordered list of tuples pi =
{(c1, t1, y1) . . . (cn, tn, yn)}, with (cj , tj , yj) indicating the
jth comment, timestamp, and hostility label, respectively.
We assume yj = 1 indicates a hostile comment, and yj = 0
otherwise. Given the patterns observed above, we consider
the following two forecasting tasks:
Task 1: Hostility presence forecasting. Given an
initial sequence of non-hostile comments on a post,
predict whether at least one future comment will be
hostile. That is, for each post the system observes
{(c1, t1, y1) . . . (cj , tj , yj)} where yi = 0 ∀ i ≤ j and must
predict whether there is some subsequent comment k > j
such that yk = 1.
We refer to tk − tj as the lead time: the amount of time
between the final comment observed by the system and the
3Increasing the number of clusters up to 10 had similar results.
time of the first hostile message. From an intervention per-
spective, greater lead times are desirable, since they provide
more opportunity to take preventative measures. However,
we expect problem difficulty to increase with required lead
times, which we investigate below.
Task 2: Hostility intensity forecasting. Given all com-
ments up to and including the first hostile comment, predict
whether the total number of hostile comments on a post will
be greater than or equal to a given threshold N . That is, the
system observes {(c1, t1, y1) . . . (cj , tj , yj)}, where yj = 1
and yi = 0 ∀ i < j. A post containing m comments has a
positive label if
∑m
k=1 yk ≥ N . WhenN is large, the system
is designed to identify posts with a high intensity (volume)
of hostile comments, which can then be prioritized for inter-
vention.
Because we frame both tasks as binary classification prob-
lems, we model each task using logistic regression with L2
regularization.4 We next describe the features used for this
classifier.
5.1 Features
For both tasks, we compute features over the linguistic con-
text of the current post and the historical context of the users
participating in the post.
• Unigram (U) We tokenize each comment into unigrams,
retaining emojis as separate words, and collapsing all user
@mentions to a single feature type. Multiple comments
are collapsed into a single bag-of-words vector.
• Word2vec (w2v) To overcome the sparsity of unigram
features, we fit a word2vec model (Mikolov et al. 2013)
on the ∼15M unlabeled comments collected in our initial
crawl. We set the vector length to 100 dimensions, and
to aggregate the vectors for each word in a comment, we
concatenate the maximum and average along each word
vector dimension (i.e., 200 total features).
• n-gram word2vec (n-w2v) Bojanowski et al. (2016) in-
troduce an extension to word2vec designed to model char-
acter n-grams, rather than words, which may help when
dealing with short social media messages that contain ab-
breviations and spelling errors. We train on the same 15M
comments using this n-gram word2vec model and again
use maximum and average vectors to aggregate across
words in a sentence.
• Hatebase/ProfaneLexicon (lex) We include features in-
dicating whether a comment contains words present in
two lexicons of offensive language: Hatebase5 and Luis
von Ahn’s Offensive/Profane Word List6. Hatebase has
582 hate words in English, and categorizes each hate word
into six different categories: class, disability, ethnicity,
gender, nationality and religion. For each category, we
have a binary feature that is one if the sentence has at least
one word in Hatebase; we add an additional feature for the
total count across all categories. The Offensive/Profane
4Additional experiments with a Random Forest classifier pro-
duced similar results.
5www.hatebase.org
6www.cs.cmu.edu/∼biglou/resources/
Word List provides 1,300+ English terms that may be con-
sidered offensive; we include both binary and count fea-
tures for this lexicon as well.
• Final comment (final-com) For posts with many com-
ments, it may be necessary to place greater emphasis on
the most recent comment. To do so, we create a separate
feature vector using only the most recent comment, us-
ing unigram, n-gram word2vec, and lexicon features. E.g.,
one such feature may indicate that a word from the Hate-
base lexicon appeared in the most recent observed com-
ment for this post.
• Previous comments (prev-com) Prior work suggests that
a user’s recent posts may indicate their propensity to post
offensive comments in the near future (Cheng et al. 2017).
To capture this notion, we first identify the usernames
of the authors of each comment the system observes in
the target post. We then identify the most recent com-
ment each user has made in a post other than the target
post. We then concatenate all these comments together,
building unigram, n-gram word2vec and lexicon features.
These features serve to summarize what the commenters
in the current post have recently said in prior posts.
• Previous post (prev-post) Conversely, certain users’
posts may be more likely to receive hostile comments
than others, perhaps because of their content, recent ad-
versarial interactions with other users, or other attributes
of the user. To capture this, we collect the most recent post
made by the author of the target post and concatenate all
the comments in that post, again using unigram, n-gram
word2vec and lexicon features. These features serve to
summarize the recent conversations involving the author
of the target post.
• Trend Feature (trend) While the linguistic features sum-
marize the context of the current conversation, they ig-
nore the order of the comments. The goal of this feature
type is to detect an increase over time in the hostilities ex-
pressed in the current post to identify trends that precede
hostile comments. To do so, we first train a separate lo-
gistic regression classifier to determine if a comment ex-
presses hostility or not, using the same unigram, n-gram
word2vec, and lexicon features from above (it obtains
cross-validation AUC of ∼.8). We then apply this classi-
fier to each comment observed in the target post, record-
ing the predicted posterior probability that each comment
is hostile.7 We then compute several features over this
vector of posterior probabilities: (1) the number and frac-
tion of comments that have positive probability larger than
some threshold (0.3 in the experiments below); (2) the
maximum slope within two adjacent probabilities of posi-
tive class (to detect sudden shifts in the conversation); (3)
the difference between the maximum and minimum prob-
ability across all comments.
• User activity (user) Finally, inspired by evidence that
group heterogeneity can increase likelihood of hostility
(Dovidio et al. 2013), we compute two additional features
7This classifier is trained with double cross-validation so that it
never predicts the label of a comment that was in its training set.
based on the number of users who have commented on
the target post: (1) the number of unique users divided by
the number of comments (to quantify the heterogeneity
of comment authors); and (2) the fraction of comments
containing a user @mention (to quantify the volume of
directed utterances).
6 Experiments
We conduct 10-fold cross-validation experiments to mea-
sure the forecasting accuracy for each task.8 For Task 1, the
system observes the first comments of a post and predicts
whether some hostile comment will appear. Rather than fix-
ing the number of comments observed, we instead vary the
lead time, defined as the time from the final comment ob-
served on a post to the time of the first hostile comment. For
example, if the first hostile comment on a post occurs at 3
p.m., a lead time of 1 hour means that the forecasting sys-
tem will observe all comments on the post made before 2
p.m. We consider lead times of {1, 3, 5, 8, 10} hours. Since
the optimal classifier may vary by lead time, we train sepa-
rate models for each lead time. We chose these lead time in-
tervals based on our observations of the pace at which com-
ments are posted and when hostile comments first appear
(see Figure 2).
For some lead times, posts may be discarded from experi-
ments — e.g., if the lead time is 10 hours, but the first hostile
message occurs in the first hour, then it is not possible to ob-
serve any comments in time for that post. Similarly, the lead
time also affects the number of comments the system may
observe on average (i.e., longer lead times typically mean
fewer comments may be observed before making a predic-
tion). We sample an equal number of positive and negative
examples for this task; to avoid introducing bias between
classes, positive and negative samples are matched by the
number of comments (e.g., for a positive example where we
observe six comments, we sample a matched negative exam-
ple from the set of non-hostile posts and restrict the obser-
vation to the first six comments.)
For the second task (hostility intensity forecasting), the
system observes the first comments of a post, up to and in-
cluding the first hostile comment, and predicts whether there
will be ≥ N total hostile comments on the post. Thus, N
serves as a threshold for instances to be considered in the
positive class. From a practical perspective, it is more use-
ful to distinguish between posts with 1 versus 10 hostile
comments rather than 1 versus 2 hostile comments. We thus
vary N from 5-15, training separate models for each setting.
For a given N , positive instances must have ≥ N hostile
comments, while negative instances must have only 1 hos-
tile comment (posts with other values are not included in
this analysis). Thus, the goal is to separate “one-off” hostile
comments from those that result in an escalation of hostility.
Because both tasks can be viewed as ranking problems
(to prioritize interventions), our primary evaluation metric
is AUC (area under the ROC curve). For comparison, we
also report F1, Precision, and Recall.
8For replication code, see https://github.com/tapilab/icwsm-
2018-hostility
Figure 3: Hostility presence forecasting accuracy as lead
time increases.
Features AUC F1 Precision Recall
Unigram 0.790 0.737 0.723 0.778
U + prev-com 0.707 0.672 0.660 0.693
U + final-com 0.779 0.729 0.716 0.757
U + trend 0.790 0.739 0.725 0.776
U + user 0.791 0.742 0.729 0.778
U + lex 0.792 0.750 0.732 0.788
U + w2v 0.794 0.725 0.715 0.749
U + n-w2v 0.810 0.736 0.725 0.746
U + prev-post 0.828 0.761 0.756 0.765
Best 0.843 0.765 0.755 0.778
Table 2: Forecasting accuracy of Task 1 (lead time = 3
hours). The best combination uses all features except for
w2v and prev-com.
7 Results
7.1 Task 1: Presence forecasting
Figure 3 shows the AUC for four feature settings as the lead
time increases. The best model achieves a high AUC for a
lead time of one hour (0.84). There is a steady drop in accu-
racy as lead time increases, as expected. However, even with
a 10 hour lead time, the best model only declines by 2%
from a lead time of one hour (0.84 to 0.82). This suggests
that there is sufficient linguistic context early in a post to
indicate whether it will eventually attract hostile comments.
This figure also suggests that the n-gram word2vec features
are somewhat more predictive than the traditional word2vec
features across all lead times.
Table 2 provides a detailed feature comparison for a lead
time of 3 hours. We can see that the previous post features
are the most useful addition to the unigram features, increas-
ing AUC from .790 to .828. Thus, users who have received
hostile comments in the past are more likely to receive them
in the future. In contrast, the previous comment features are
unhelpful — including them actually reduces AUC from
.790 to .707. Upon further inspection, we attribute this to
Figure 4: Hostility presence forecasting accuracy as ob-
served comments increase (lead time=3 hours).
the fact that very often (494 of 591 hostile posts) the first
hostile comment on a post is from a user who has not previ-
ously commented on this post. Thus, including features from
the users who have commented on the post already may tell
us little about the user who will initiate hostility. Together,
these results suggest that certain users are more susceptible
to receiving hostile comments.
Figure 4 stratifies the results of the four models by the
number of observed comments, where the lead time is 3
hours. We can see that the number of observed comments
can greatly affect accuracy. The best model has an AUC of
.71 when observing only one comment, but an AUC of .92
when observing 7-9 comments. In practice, one may wish
to restrict forecasts to posts with a sufficient number of ob-
served comments. Furthermore, it appears that the previ-
ous post features most improve over baselines when there
are few observed comments, presumably by providing addi-
tional context that is missing when there are few comments.
Figure 4 somewhat surprisingly shows a decrease in AUC
when observing 10 or more comments. By reviewing these
posts, we observe several instances of what we call “non-
sequitur hostility.” For example, a post may quickly receive
20 innocuous, non-controversial comments (e.g., congratu-
lating the poster on some achievement). Subsequently, a new
user writes a hostile comment that is unrelated to the preced-
ing conversation. These instances are very difficult to pre-
dict – since the model observes many innocuous comments,
it assigns a low probability of seeing a hostile comment in
the future. It is possible that accuracy may be improved by
training separate classifiers after grouping by the number of
observed comments.
7.2 Task 2: Intensity forecasting
Figure 5 shows the AUC for the best model as the positive
class threshold increases. As expected, it is easier to identify
posts that will receive 10 or more hostile comments than
those that will receive only 5 or more. Table 3 reports results
from different feature combinations using 10 as the positive
class threshold. As in Task 1, the previous post features lead
to improved AUC (.842 vs .808), but the previous comment
Features AUC F1 Precision Recall
Unigram 0.808 0.747 0.741 0.673
U + w2v 0.753 0.696 0.662 0.673
U + prev-com 0.786 0.701 0.694 0.605
U + user 0.817 0.761 0.752 0.695
U + n-w2v 0.821 0.775 0.781 0.711
U + trend 0.825 0.778 0.782 0.721
U + lex 0.827 0.776 0.785 0.705
U + prev-post 0.842 0.782 0.829 0.688
U + final-com 0.879 0.792 0.805 0.722
Best 0.913 0.805 0.785 0.772
Table 3: Forecasting accuracy of Task 2 (N=10). The best
feature combination is trend/user/final-com.
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Figure 5: Hostility intensity forecasting accuracy as the pos-
itive class threshold increases (with standard errors).
features do not (.786 vs. .808). These results suggest that
it is possible to distinguish between posts that will receive
an isolated hostile comment and those that will receive high
volumes of hostile comments. Thus, interventions may be
prioritized by the expected intensity of hostile interactions.
To better understand the which features are leading indi-
cators of a high volume of hostile comments, we examined
the top coefficients for the positive class for N = 10. Over-
all, the final-comment features are the most predictive — it
seems that features of the first hostile message are predictive
of the volume of hostile message in the future. Examining
the top coefficients for these features, we find that if the first
hostile comment contains a user mention, a second-person
pronoun, or profanity, it is correlated with a high intensity
post. Other top features include: (1) a term matching the Pro-
fane Lexicon was used in a comment made on an earlier post
by this author; (2) a comment on the current post contains a
term from the Gender category in the HateBase lexicon; (3)
the abbreviation “stfu” (“shut the f**k up”), which indicates
a possible turning point in the conversation leading to an es-
calation in hostilities; (4) singular second- and third-person
pronouns like “you” and “she,” which indicate that the con-
versation is directed toward specific users rather than distant
third parties.
We also examined a sample of forecasting errors. False
negatives often occur when many similar innocuous mes-
sages are posted consecutively, giving no indication of any
escalation. For example, in one post, the first thirty com-
ments were short messages wishing the author a happy birth-
day. The first hostile comment insulted the post author, re-
sulting in many retaliatory messages from his friends. How-
ever, given the limited information in the first comments, the
system did not predict this escalation in hostility.
This example demonstrates the nuance of online hostili-
ties — it is rare in our data to see clear victims and perpe-
trators. Instead, it is more common to see an outsider write
insulting messages to an individual, which in turn leads oth-
ers to make insulting responses, which in turn escalates into
a back-and-forth of hostile messages.
8 Limitations
As described in §3, the data is not a uniform random sample
of all Instagram posts. Thus, the observed frequency of hos-
tile comments should not be interpreted as an estimate of the
true fraction of hostile comments on Instagram. Instead, we
focused our limited annotation resources on posts that are
(1) likely to be from vulnerable populations (teenagers) and
(2) likely to contain hostility. To do so, we used a broad set
of keywords to find an initial set of 538 comments (and cor-
responding posts), which we then augmented with 596 posts
that did not contain such keywords. Although the seed sam-
ple of 538 comments is influenced by the keywords chosen,
by annotating all the other comments in each post we also
capture many additional hostile comments that do not match
the initial set of keywords. Indeed, over 85% of the hostile
comments in the final data were not retrieved by the initial
keyword search. Furthermore, of the 538 posts containing
a hostile keyword, only 504 were annotated as hostile; of
the 596 posts that did not contain a hostile keyword, 87 had
at least one comment annotated as hostile. Thus, the data
contain many hostile comments that do not match the key-
words, as well as many non-hostile comments that do match
the keywords.
While the data may not be strictly representative of the
population of all types of hostile content, we do find it to
reflect a broad array of hostile content among a demographic
that is highly vulnerable to the effects of online hostility.
9 Conclusion
We proposed methods to forecast both the presence and in-
tensity of hostility in Instagram comments. Using a combi-
nation of linguistic and social features, the best model pro-
duces an AUC of 0.82 for forecasting the presence of hostil-
ity ten or more hours in the future, and an AUC of 0.91 for
forecasting whether a post will receive more than 10 hostile
comments or only one hostile comment. We find several pre-
dictors of future hostility, including (1) the post’s author has
received hostile comments in the past; (2) the use of user-
directed profanity; (3) the number of distinct users partici-
pating in a conversation; and (4) trends in hostility thus far
in the conversation.
By distinguishing between posts that will receive many
hostile comments and those that will receive few or none, the
methods proposed here provide new ways to prioritize spe-
cific posts for intervention. Since moderation resources are
limited, it makes sense to assign them to posts where there
is still time to de-escalate a conversation or prevent addi-
tional commenting. For instance, Instagram and similar plat-
forms could use our approach to manage their moderation
queues. Similarly, Instagram may use features our approach
identifies (e.g., prior hostilities, number of distinct users)
to improve their existing comment management features—
offensive comment filtering and comment controls.
There are several avenues for future work. Given that In-
stagram is primarily a photo-sharing site, it is possible that
image classification algorithms can be used to identify im-
age attributes that predict hostile comments. Second, given
the predictive power of the previous post feature, inferring
more detailed user attributes (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity,
etc.) may provide additional context for forecasting. Third,
it may be possible to extract from these data insights into
the effectiveness of de-escalation strategies — e.g., given a
hostile comment, are there certain responses that diffuse the
situation, as opposed to leading to increased hostilities? Ar-
gumentation mining methods may be applicable here (Palau
and Moens 2009). Finally, we are experimenting with user-
facing tools that allow users to monitor their own feeds (or
their children’s) for brewing escalations, enabling them to
take action on- or offline.
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